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Should we fear or hope for Chinese acquisitions? 
Evidence from Italy  
 






In 2016, Chinese outward FDI exceeded inward investment flows, making the country a net 
exporter of capital, like the large advanced economies. The majority of Chinese investments 
are M&As, with the aim to acquire strategic assets (advanced technology and know-how) and 
access to markets (brands). The rapid growth of Chinese direct investments has raised many 
concerns among the advanced economies. The most important one is the fear that these 
investments will not produce the positive effects on the host economy typically associated with 
FDI from advanced countries, but a one-sided transfer of technology and know-how from 
acquired European firms to China. 
  
However, there does not seem to be any evidence so far of a negative impact of Chinese 
investors on the acquired companies and the host economies. In particular, accurate studies on 
the pre and post-acquisition behaviour of European companies acquired by Chinese investors 
are still lacking.  
  
This research intends to offer a contribution in this direction by providing new and detailed data 
on Chinese investments in Italy and by trying a first and tentative assessment of the performance 
of Italian companies recently acquired or controlled by Chinese investors. To this purpose, we 
have built an original database gathering detailed company information on more than 7.000 
Italian companies with Chinese shareholders. Second, we have studied the pre- and post-
acquisition performance of 198 Italian target firms. 
  
Overall the results appear quite positive. Roughly 2/3 of the acquired companies have seen an 
increase in turnover, total assets, and shareholder’s funds and 50% has had an increase in fixed 
assets. Revenues show a decrease soon after the acquisition followed by a steady growth 
starting from the third year. Employment and profitability results appear more balanced. The 
number of companies which has registered an increase in employment is roughly similar to the 
number of those that have experienced a decline, but there is some evidence that Chinese 
shareholders prefer to avoid layoffs even in front of severe reductions in turnover. This attitude 
is reflected in profitability, which especially in the first years soon after the acquisition tend to 
decrease, followed by a recovery in the following years. Overall, the analysis suggest a long 
term orientation of Chinese acquirers which deserves further investigation. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since the economic reforms and “opening-up” policy, the transfer of technology from advanced 
economies through foreign direct investments and trade has played a crucial role in China, 
helping the transformation of the weak and backward Chinese economy into a modern industrial 
power. For a long time, outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) were negligible. Things 
began to change completely at the turn of the century, when the Chinese foreign investments 
started to grow exponentially, strongly encouraged by the Government through the so-called 
“go-out policy, first announced in the Five-Year Plan of 2001, and the accession to WTO in 
2001 (Boateng et al. 2008, Knoerick and Miedtank 2018). As a result, in 2016 and for the first 
time, Chinese OFDI exceeded inward investment flows, making the country a net exporter of 
capital, like the large advanced economies (Figure 1).  
Figure 1 - China Foreign Direct Investment flows: Inward and Outward.  




Starting from 2011, Europe has become the main destination of Chinese investors (Figure 2)3. 
The integrated European Union is indeed highly attractive for foreign companies. First, by 
investing in a single member State, they gain access to the entire European market. Second, the 
high level of technology in many European industries forms another very important pull factor 
for Chinese companies (Brod et al. 2012, Dreger et al. 2017, Ma and Overbeek 2015). Lastly, 
the EU has one of the world's most open investment regimes, as is testified by the OECD FDI 
Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. The opportunities to invest in Europe have been greatly 
favored by the consequences of the global financial crisis (Meunier 2014). Due the weak 
recovery of many European economies, many European firms experienced a period of troubles 
                                               
3 Top-down, macro data on Chinese ODI must be managed with caution, particularly with regards to the destination 
and the sector of activity (see Hanemann 2014). Official data published in China by the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) or the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) do not distinguish between the first and the 
ultimate destination of investments. This explains the prevalence of Hong Kong and tax havens like Cayman 
Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda as destination countries. More reliable information comes following a 
bottom-up approach used by different Western public and private sources and think tanks that collect detailed data 
on individual transactions and M&As involving a Chinese investor in the ultimate destination countries. Some of 
the most important databases are provided by Rhodium Group’s China Investment Monitor and Heritage 










































































and difficulty. This created favorable conditions for acquisitions by deep-pocket Chinese 
foreign investors, helped by the appreciation of the renminbi (Meunier et al. 2014). 
 
In terms of FDI, the relationship between Europe and China is characterized by important 
differences and lack of reciprocity. The main difference is related to the type of investment. 
While the majority of European investments in China are greenfield, this typology is on average 
negligible in Chinese investments in Europe (5.7% on average in the last ten years, according 
to China Investment Tracker data). Chinese firms entered Europe basically through M&As (see 
Hanemann and Routari 2018, Hay 2016). The lack of reciprocity is due to the fact that while 
Europe is an easy and open market for foreign investors, the same is not true for China, which 
is one of the most restrictive economies in the world for FDI according to the OECD Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index. As a consequence, in the last five years Chinese investments in Europe 
were not mirrored by a comparable amount of European FDI in China. In 2016, Chinese FDI 
flows were five times higher than European ones (Bickenbach and Liu 2018).  
Figure 2 - Flows of Chinese FDI per Region (2005-2018) - % of Total 




2. Reaction and concerns 
 
In 2017, the pace of Chinese foreign investment slowed down dramatically, and in 2018 
outward stocks were slightly lower than inward stocks (Figure 1). There are several reasons for 
the decline, some of internal origin, others attributable to the reaction of recipient countries.  
 
On the domestic side, aware of the threat to the country’s financial stability in the aftermath of 
the RMB’s unexpected devaluation in August 2015, the Chinese government increased the 
scrutiny of OFDI to avoid capital outflows and risky operations. According to a new regulation, 
some strategic OFDI are encouraged (e.g. infrastructure projects that are tied to the Belt and 
Road Initiative, high-tech and advanced manufacturing enterprises, R&D, energy resources), 
some are restricted (ODI against the countries’ national interests or risky investments, such as 
real estate, sports clubs, hotels, entertainment and the film industry), some are prohibited, like 
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On the international side, the rapid growth of Chinese direct investments has raised concerns 
and fears among the advanced economies, especially in Europe and US. This is for several 
reasons. 
 
The first is related to technology. China is the world's second largest economy, a strong and 
ambitious nation, but it is still an emerging economy. It is the first time that a developing 
country produces a flow of investments of this magnitude to technologically and economically 
more advanced countries (Meunier 2018). In this case, the positive effects on the host economy 
typically associated with FDI, in the form of technology transfer and spillovers, are more 
difficult to realize. On the contrary, there is a fear of a one-sided transfer of technology and 
know-how from acquired European firms to China (Bickenbach and Liu 2018, Zhang 2014). 
This is consistent with the Made in China 2025 government program, which explicitly states 
the goal of promoting the technological catching-up of Chinese companies also through 
investments aimed at acquiring foreign technologies and brands in strategic industries. 
 
Furthermore, once important technology and brands have been acquired, Chinese companies 
could downsize or even close their activities in Europe and transfer the assets to China, taking 
advantage of the better cost and political conditions, with negative effects on European 
employment (asset-stripping) (Meunier 2018). All this could reduce the competitiveness and 
technological leadership of Western companies to the benefit of China's economic ambitions.  
The second reason is the uniqueness of China’s system of government and economic regulation, 
which is substantially different from those of Western and other advanced economies (Meunier 
2018). China is a one-party socialist republic, a capitalist economy with "Chinese 
characteristics", i.e a system where the State and the Communist Party play an active and 
fundamental role in the economy. As a consequence, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), supported 
by the Government, are still very important in some strategic sectors and very active in the field 
of foreign direct investment. 
 
Even when investments are made by private firms and operators, there is still the suspicion that 
their decisions are strongly influenced by government strategies and policies, rather than by 
purely economic or profit motives (Bickenbach and Liu 2018; Meunier 2018). Furthermore, the 
direct and indirect presence of the State in investment activities through subsidies and political 
protection gives Chinese companies unfair competitive advantages over European firms. The 
opacity of relations between Chinese investors and the Chinese government is certainly one of 
the main causes of the growing diffidence shown by European governments. 
 
The third reason for concern, repeatedly put forward by European and Western governments, 
is the issue of strategic security. China is not a strategic and military ally of Western countries. 
Although it is a non-hostile nation, it is a great economic, technological and military power, 
which exercises increasing geo-political influence in most of the planet. There is the risk that 
advanced technologies, such as IT and telecommunications, normally applied to consumer 
products may be developed and used for military purposes (risk of dual-use technology) 
(Meunier 2018). 
 
The last reason of concern relates to the political and ethical sphere (FDI as political leverage, 
Meunier 2018, Zhang 2014). Foreign investment may be used as a form of pressure on host 
governments to support China in particularly sensitive international political issues, such as 
human rights, Tibet, One-China Policy, Hong Kong's autonomy, as well as to support the geo-
political ambitions of the OBOR program. Although this fear is probably more important for 
weak and developing nations that increasingly rely on China’s support for their infrastructures, 





In Europe, USA, and in other advanced countries, the main consequence of all these concerns 
and fears is the development of measures that provide more tight screening of FDI. The recent 
EU Commission document (EU-China, A strategic outlook, March 2019) is extremely revealing 
in this regard. While the changed role of China in the global scenario is recognized, it is 
emphasized that China should be considered not only a partner in cooperation, but also: “an 
economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership”, and, more generally, “a 
systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” With regard to China, therefore, 
the EU must: “robustly seek more balanced and reciprocal conditions governing the economic 
relationship.” 
 
In December 2020, after seven years of complex and difficult negotiations, EU and China 
signed a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). In the words of the President of the 
European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, the deal “will provide unprecedented access to 
the Chinese market for European investors, enabling our businesses to grow and create jobs. 
It will also commit China to ambitious principles on sustainability, transparency and non-
discrimination. The agreement will rebalance our economic relationship with China”. 
 
3. Motivation and objectives of the research 
 
Our research is inspired by this big picture, data and discussion. Despite all the concerns and 
fears mentioned above, often amplified by the media or by specific political or economic 
interest groups, there does not seem to be any evidence so far that the presence of Chinese 
companies and investors represents a negative event for Europe as a whole and for the local 
economies. In this regard, top-down and general data on Chinese FDI cannot help us much. The 
in-depth investigation of bottom-up data is much more promising.  
 
To our knowledge, statistically accurate studies on the pre and post-acquisition behaviour of 
companies acquired or participated by Chinese investors are still lacking. Some works analyse 
the post-acquisition performance of acquired firms by foreign companies in China (Wand and 
Wang 2015, Liu et al. 2017, Chang et al. 2013). Another strand of the literature focus on the 
performance of the acquiring Chinese companies, not on the performance of the target firms in 
developed countries (Edamura et al. 2014). The only exception is the interesting paper by 
Buckley et al. (2011). This study investigates the impact of FDI from different emerging 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) on the performance of firms acquired in Europe, 
North America, and Japan between 2000 and 2007. However, the scope of this work is too 
broad and the database used is too old to provide interesting insights on the recent wave of 
acquisitions by Chinese firms.  
 
We need more and detailed studies on the pre and post- acquisition behaviour of the target 
companies, on their managerial styles and industrial relations, on their productivity and 
operational performance, and on the changes in market valuations. It would be interesting to 
compare these companies with other target firms taken over or controlled by multinationals 
from other countries. We also need more research on the regional impact of these companies, 
in terms of employment, technological spillovers, relations with other companies, competitive 
structures. 
 
It is time to move from analysing aggregate data at the country level to a more specific 
assessment of individual investment projects. This research intends to offer a first contribution 
in this direction by providing new and detailed data on Chinese investments in Italy and by 
trying a first and tentative assessment of the performance of Italian companies recently acquired 
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by Chinese investors. This assessment discounts the fact that the acquisitions are still a few 
years old and many of the reorganization processes have probably just started. The idea is to 
continue monitoring these activities over time, in order to offer a more reliable evaluation of 
the costs and benefits of the growing presence of Chinese firms in Italy and useful insights for 
a more general assessment of the impact of Chinese FDI in Europe. 
4. Research structure 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we have seen the growing relevance of Chinese investments 
worldwide and in Europe. As far as Italy is concerned, Table 1 shows the stock of FDI by 
ultimate investment country. 
Table 1- Italy's inward direct investment stocks by ultimate investing country (Mln €)  




Official statistics on FDI such as the one shown in Table 1 present several limits, the most 
relevant being the distortion in flows and stocks due to the increasing relevance of investments 
made through tax havens and tax friendly countries. The relevance in Table 1 of the small 
Luxembourg and the presence of Cayman Islands even in statistics that should report the 
ultimate investment country is a clear evidence of this distortion. Besides, official statistics only 
measure the relevance of foreign investments and they are of little use to understand the 
effectiveness of such investments. This is why we decided to study the Chinese FDI 
Partner Country 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Share 
2019
France 47,375    55,481    55,007    61,525    64,769    16.3%
United States 32,227    32,388    38,446    45,416    42,883    10.8%
Italy 30,065    31,429    39,721    38,398    41,708    10.5%
United Kingdom 29,407    31,288    38,995    39,271    38,690    9.8%
Germany 20,544    31,338    33,134    32,458    33,280    8.4%
Cayman Islands 7,475      8,502      8,848      9,921      25,645    6.5%
Luxembourg 17,907    24,386    23,485    24,757    23,699    6.0%
Switzerland 18,101    17,583    21,027    28,874    23,322    5.9%
Netherlands 15,140    18,375    17,940    15,090    12,227    3.1%
Japan 6,525      4,408      9,266      7,883      7,729      2.0%
Spain 5,760      4,712      4,410      4,952      5,060      1.3%
China 573         3,374      4,829      4,930      4,721      1.2%
Austria 4,351      3,758      3,472      3,641      3,722      0.9%
Sweden 2,027      953         2,492      2,283      2,893      0.7%
Belgium 2,451      3,840      3,049      2,074      2,440      0.6%
Denmark 2,887      2,525      2,135      1,938      2,119      0.5%
Canada 714         987         1,358      1,791      1,714      0.4%
Russian Federation 2,198      454         1,851      1,496      1,667      0.4%
Ireland 628         1,316      2,966      1,925      1,494      0.4%
Singapore 188         181         1,373      1,431      1,436      0.4%
Qatar 496         1,303      1,781      1,377      1,267      0.3%
Republic of South Korea 501         566         1,022      1,373      1,028      0.3%
Chinese Taipei 234         317         360         823         743         0.2%
Hong Kong, China 41           657         47-           12           4             0.0%
Others 6,892      7,399      8,925      9,148      7,516      1.9%
Unallocated and confidential 58,022    47,018    28,308    35,716    44,517    11.2%
Total 312,728   334,537   354,151   378,502   396,294   100%
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phenomenon with a bottom-approach, aiming to analyze all the Italian companies participated 
or controlled by Chinese companies or individuals of Chinese nationality, with a particular 
attention to acquisitions. Besides eliminating the distortion related to tax havens, this approach 
has enabled us to analyze the results of such investments and to obtain a good quantitative base 
on which to found a more detailed and qualitative analysis of specific cases. 
 
The objectives of our research can be traced to the following points: 
 
• analyze the trend of Chinese direct investments in Italy over time; 
• evaluate the performance of Italian companies acquired by Chinese investors; 
• analyze the strategic objectives and management style of Chinese investors. 
 
In order to pursue the objectives above, we articulated our research work into three phases.  
 
First of all, we have built a dataset containing all the Italian companies controlled by Chinese 
investors, adopting a very broad approach and therefore including all types of investment 
(acquisitions, greenfield investments, minority stakes, entrepreneurial activities), companies of 
all sizes and both majority and minority shareholdings. The aim of this first phase is to create a 
list as complete as possible of Italian companies participated by Chinese shareholders and to 
classify them along several parameters, the most important of which are the type of investment, 
the type of shareholder, and the size. The first phase of the research has enabled us to identify 
subsets of companies controlled by Chinese corporations or individuals on which to carry out 
a more in-depth analysis.  
 
In the second phase of our research we built a dataset containing the results in terms of turnover, 
employees, assets, profitability, equity, and financial debts of Chinese controlled companies. 
At present this dataset has been built only for acquisitions of companies with a turnover of at 
least €2 Mln, but in the future it will be enlarged to include other categories such as greenfield 
investments. The two dataset together constitute what we call the “China-Italy FDI Database”. 
 
The third phase of our research consists in a qualitative analysis of the most relevant companies 
included in the database, with the aim of understanding the management style of Chinese 
investors and their strategic objectives. We are at the very beginning of this third phase and at 
the moment we have analyzed 34 cases using secondary data, creating the basis for future 
structured interviews. 
5. The construction of the China-Italy FDI Database 
 
Our China-Italy FDI Database (CI FDI DB) is made of two related datasets:  
 
• CI FDI Profiles Dataset: includes all the relatively stable information for each company, 
such as Company Name, Legal form, Province, Incorporation year, and so on. This dataset 
includes companies of all sizes and at present contains 7.379 companies.  
• CI FDI Results Dataset: includes all the information that needs to be updated on a yearly 
basis, such as Employees, Revenues, Total assets, and other financial indicators. At present 
this datasets covers only the companies with a turnover higher than €2 Mln which have been 
acquired by Chinese shareholders, therefore excluding greenfield investments and 
entrepreneurial activities started up by citizens of Chinese nationality living in Italy. At 
present this dataset contains 198 companies, but only for 173 of these we succeeded in 




In both datasets, the source for the data is mainly the AIDA database by Bureau Van Dijk, 
integrated with information obtained from other databases such as Zephyr and SDC Platinum. 
Besides the information downloaded from AIDA, we added manually other information in 
order to be able to classify the companies according to several criteria. We refer to Appendix 1 
for the list of all the fields downloaded from Aida and to Appendix 2 for the list of the field 
added manually, which basically are the following: 
 
• size category; 
• share controlled (Majority; Minority or Minority <10%); 
• most relevant Chinese shareholder name and type (Individuals; Private company or 
State Owned); 
• Global Ultimate Owner (GUO) type; 
• investment type (Acquisition, Greenfield, Entrepreneurial Activities or Minority) 
• industry classification by sector and by technology (for manufacturing sectors) or 
knowledge intensity (for service sectors); 
• presence of listed companies in the chain of control; 
• presence of companies in the chain of control located in tax havens. 
 
As stated above, at present the companies included in the CI FDI Profiles Dataset are 7.379. 
These companies have been identified as follows: 
 
• we have filtered on AIDA all the Italian companies with at least one Chinese shareholder 
(including minority shareholdings); 
• we have consulted several M&A databases, including Zephyr (by Bureau van Dijk), SDC 
Platinum (by Thomson Reuters) and Datenna, making the list of all the M&A operations 
with Chinese acquirers and Italian targets. Almost all the targets were already in the AIDA 
set and we manually added the few companies that were not already included. The reason 
behind these missing companies was usually the fact that for some investors located in tax 
havens AIDA had not been able to identify the real global ultimate owner. 
 
From the point of view of the relevance of the Chinese share, our dataset is distributed as 
described in the following table. 
Table 2 – CI FDI Profile Dataset – Companies by relevance of Chinese share 
 
Chinese Share No. of companies 
Majority 5,964 
Minority 1,174 
Minority <10% 206 
Shares sold/Dissolved 35* 
Grand Total 7,379 
*These are ex acquisitions or greenfield 
investments which have been sold or dissolved. 
Including these, the total number of companies 
with a majority Chinese stake in the present or in 
the past is 5.999 
 





• excluding possible mistakes, the dataset includes all the Italian companies controlled by 
Chinese shareholders, as Aida enables the filtering by the nationality of the Global Ultimate 
Owner, regardless of the nationality of the direct shareholder. For example, a company 
directly controlled by a shareholder located in Luxembourg is included if the Luxembourg 
shareholder is ultimately controlled by a Chinese company. 
• Italian companies with a minority Chinese stake are included only if the share is directly 
owned by a Chinese company, as AIDA allows the identification of the ultimate owner only 
for majority stakes. Minority stakes are therefore only partially represented in our dataset. 
 
According to the guidelines established by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), a foreign direct investment is defined by a minimum ownership stake 
of 10%. However, we decided to include also smaller shares in our dataset, as they may indicate 
an interest worth of attention. Table 4 shows the largest Italian companies with a Chinese 
minority stake included in the dataset. 
 

















ENI S.P.A.       28,496 Manufacture of refined petroleum 
products
2020         1.01 PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA Bank
INTESA SANPAOLO 
SPA
      11,418 Other monetary intermediation 2015         2.01 PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA Bank
AUTOSTRADE PER 
L'ITALIA S.P.A.
         3,835 Service activities incidental to land 
transportation
2017         5.00 SILK ROAD FUND CO. LTD. CHINA Corporate
SAIPEM S.P.A.          2,382 Construction of residential and non-
residential buildings
2014         2.03 PEOPLE'S BANK OF CHINA Bank




FRENI BREMBO - 
S.P.A. 
            948 Manufacture of other parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles






            925 Manufacture of agricultural and 
forestry machinery
2018       10.00 KINGENTA ECOLOGICAL 
ENGINEERING GROUP COMPANY 
LIMITED
Corporate
IMA S.P.A.             836 Manufacture of other general-
purpose machinery nec






            678 Manufacture of engines and 
turbines, except aircraft, vehicle 
and cycle engines






FASHION BOX S.P.A.             190 Manufacture of wearing apparel, 
except fur apparel






            161 Manufacture of lifting and handling 
equipment
2016       20.00 ZHEJIANG DINGLI MACHINERY 
COMPANY LIMITED
Corporate
TREVI S.P.A.             137 Other specialised construction 
activities nec







               90 Manufacture of irradiation, 
electromedical and 
electrotherapeutic equipment





6. Classification of the companies included in the database 
 
Although our database includes many Italian companies with minority Chinese stakes, our work 
has been focused mainly on majority stakes. Especially for the latter group, we classified the 
companies according to the first year of the Chinese investment, investment type, Chinese 
shareholder type and GUO type.  
 
The classification is based both on information provided by AIDA and other databases, such as 
Zephyr and SDC Platinum, and on information gathered online, for example by searching for 
articles about the company and / or visiting its website. As the classification of thousands of 
companies is very time consuming, first of all we tried to classify the companies in the dataset 
automatically, on the base of the data downloaded from AIDA. After this first stage, we 
manually classified all the remaining companies with revenues over 2 million euros.  
 
The following table summarizes the distribution of Italian companies controlled by Chinese 
shareholders by investment type. 
Table 4 – Chinese controlled Italian companies by Type of Investment and Size (includes 
5.964 majority stakes + 35 cases of shares sold/dissolved) 
Source: CI FDI Profile Dataset 
 
Chinese Share Over 2 Mln 
Under 2 
Mln or n.a. Total 
Acquisition 198 127 325 
Greenfield 67 216* 283 
Total Acquisition + Greenfield 265 343 608 
Entrepreneurial Activities 259 4,616 4,875 
Total classified companies 524 4,959 5,483 
Undetected  516 516 
Grand Total 524 5,475 5,999 
* Greenfield investments in companies under 2Mln are probably overstated compared to 
acquisitions, as we assumed that companies incorporated from 2017 on and owned by a Chinese 
company where greenfield, while we didn't check all the companies incorporated before 2017 one 
by one and this resulted in 516 undetected companies. 
 
We have classified the companies by type of investment according to the following criteria: 
 
• companies have been classified as “Acquisition” if they were not controlled by Chinese 
shareholders in the year of their foundation; 
• companies have been classified as “Greenfield” if they were controlled by Chinese 
companies in the year of their foundation; 
• companies have been classified as “Entrepreneurial activities” if they are directly controlled 
by a Chinese individual and there are no other companies involved in the control chain. 
 
The analysis of the 265 Acquisitions and Greenfield investments with turnover over 2 Mln € 
by year shows a strong increase in the number of Chinese investments (especially acquisitions) 








Figure 3 – Chinese Acquisitions and Greenfield investments by year 
 (265 companies with turnover over 2 Mln) 





The vast majority of Chinese Acquisitions and Greenfield investments concerns companies 
headquartered in Northern Italy, especially in Milan (222 investments), while Rome accounts 
for only 68 investments. Table 5 shows the investments by region. Slightly different is the 
situation for the smaller entrepreneurial activities, which are more scattered throughout the 
national territory (Table 6). 
Table 5 – Chinese Acquisitions and Greenfield investments by region 
Source: CI FDI Profile Dataset 
 
Region Acquisition Greenfield  Total 
Lombardia 131 162 293 
Lazio 47 22 69 
Emilia Romagna 32 12 44 
Veneto 23 21 44 
Piemonte 23 19 42 
Trentino Alto Adige 27 12 39 
Toscana 13 13 26 
Liguria 4 8 12 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 7 3 10 
Other regions 18 11 29 


























































Table 6 – Chinese Entrepreneurial activities by region 





Lombardy (Milan 905 and Brescia 129) 1,357 
Latium (Rome 818) 882 
Tuscany (Prato 469 and Florence 244) 840 
Veneto (Padova 154) 414 
Emilia Romagna (Bologna 81) 299 
Campania (Naples 163) 224 
Piemonte (Turin 89) 158 
Apulia 146 
Sicily 140 
Other regions 415 
Total 4,875 
 
A very interesting analysis can be done on the type of shareholder involved in Chinese 
investments in Italy. As far as acquisitions are concerned, which represent the focus of our 
study, the shareholders are usually private companies, followed by government entities and 
private individuals (Table 7).   
 
Table 7 – Chinese controlled Italian companies by Investment Type, Type of Shareholder and 
Size (includes 5.964 majority stakes + 35 cases of shares sold/dissolved) 
Source: CI FDI Profile Dataset 
Type of shareholder 





Over 2 Mln 198 67 259   524 
Individuals 12 5 259  276 
Private company 146 54   200 
State Owned 40 8   48 
Under 2 Mln or n.a. 127 216 4,616 516 5,475 
Individuals 43 8 4,616  4,667 
Private company 68 202  107 377 
State Owned 16 6   22 
Undetected    409* 409 
Total 325 283 4,875 516 5,999 
*For these companies we do not have the name of the owner, but most of them are small commercial activities 
and therefore the owners are most likely individuals. 
 
Tables 8 and 9 focus only on the 198 acquisitions of companies with a turnover higher than €2 
mln, showing that even if the state owned companies are fewer than the ones controlled by 
private companies or individuals, their total turnover is higher. Therefore government entities’ 
acquisitions are less numerous but target larger companies. However, this result is heavily 
influenced by Pirelli, a very large group controlled by the China’s People Republic through the 
China National Chemical Corporation. Excluding the 5 companies of the Pirelli Group from 
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the analysis, state owned acquisitions are still larger, but closer to the average size of the other 
acquisitions. 
 
Table 8 – Chinese Acquisitions (turnover higher than €2 mln only) by Type of Shareholder 
Source: CI FDI Profile Dataset 
 







State Owned 40 5,978 149 
Private company 146 6,345 43 
Individuals 12 118 10 
Total 198 12,441 63 
 
Table 9 – Chinese Acquisitions (turnover higher than €2 mln only, Excluding Pirelli Group) 
by Type of Shareholder 
Source: CI FDI Profile Dataset 
 







State Owned (Excluding Pirelli Group) 35 2,420 69 
Private company 146 6,345 43 
Individuals 12 118 10 





Table 10 shows the industries of the 198 acquired companies with a turnover higher than €2 
Mln in our database. Besides the manufacturing of rubber and plastic products (heavily 
influenced by Pirelli Tyre), Chinese investors seem primarily interested in wholesale businesses 









Table 10 – Chinese Acquisitions (turnover higher than €2 mln only) by Industry 




Table 11 offers a more concise view of the type of sectors Chinese investors are more interested 
in, grouping manufacturing industries by technological intensity (High, Medium. and Low tech) 
and service industries by knowledge intensity (Knowledge Intense - KI Services and Less 
Knowledge Intense – Less KI Services)4. 
                                               
4 We have classified the industries adopting the Eurostat’s aggregation by NACE Rev.2 at 3-digit level. 




Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 4 4,082
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 36 1,892
Manufacture of electrical equipment 6 1,145
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 38 1,135
Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 3 660
Manufacture of other transport equipment 5 526
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 6 396
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 5 332
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 7 278
Manufacture of food products 3 251
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 3 198
Programming and broadcasting activities 1 171
Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities 11 159
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 6 158
Other professional, scientific and technical activities 1 145
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 5 94
Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 6 92
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 2 85
Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 3 80
Food and beverage service activities 1 71
Manufacture of wearing apparel 3 62
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 4 57
Manufacture of furniture 3 51
Civil engineering 2 48
Scientific research and development 4 47
Other manufacturing 3 35
Manufacture of textiles 3 30
Manufacture of basic metals 1 25
Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery 3 21
Manufacture of leather and related products 3 21
Advertising and market research 1 19
Accommodation 3 15
Human health activities 2 11
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 1 9
Specialised construction activities 2 8
Warehousing and support activities for transportation 2 8
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 1 6
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1 4
Rental and leasing activities 1 4
Creative, arts and entertainment activities 1 4
Real estate activities 1 3




Table 11 – Chinese Acquisitions and Greenfield investments  
by type of Industry 
Source: CI FDI Profile Dataset 
 
Acquisitions No. of companies 
Turnover – Mln € 
(last available year) 
High and Medium-high tech 67 3,434 
Medium-low tech 16 4,852 
Low tech 18 451 
KI Services 40 888 
Less KI Services 49 2,738 
Utilities and Constructions 8 80 
Total 198 12,441 
 
Greenfield No. of companies 
Turnover Mln € 
(last available year) 
High and Medium-high tech 9 457 
Medium-low tech 6 115 
KI Services 5 159 
Less KI Services 46 2,027 
Utilities and Constructions 1 3 
Total 67 2,761 
 
As Table 11 clearly shows, Chinese investors are mostly interested in acquiring companies 
operating in high tech and medium-high tech sectors. Apparently the medium-low tech sector 
is also quite relevant, but in this case the turnover is heavily influenced by Pirelli Group, which 
according to the Eurostat classification belongs to a medium-low tech industry (manufacturing 
of rubber and plastic products) but in reality should be considered medium-high tech.  
 
For both acquisitions and greenfield investments, less knowledge intense services are mainly 
attributable to wholesale activities performed by Italian branches of foreign companies 
(Chinese companies in the case of greenfield investments, foreign companies acquired by 
Chines investors in the case of acquisitions). 
 
Finally, we analysed the chain of control of the companies controlled by Chinese shareholders 
to verify if one or more of the companies in the chain of control were based in tax havens5. 





                                               
5 We identified tax havens on the basis of the rankings published by the Tax Justice Network 
(https://www.taxjustice.net), considering tax havens the jurisdictions with a Tax Haven Score of 64 over 100 or 
higher. To put this number in perspective, Italy has a tax haven score of 51 and the lowest score in the ranking 
is 33 (Greece). 
16 
 
Table 12 – Chinese Acquisitions and Greenfield investments (present investments only, shares 
sold/dissolved companies have been excluded) by involvement in tax havens. 
Sources: CI FDI Profile Dataset 
Present Acquisitions and Greenfield No Yes Total 
Over 2 Mln 135 108 243 
Under 2 Mln or n.a. 202 130 332 
Total 337 238 575 
 
 No Yes Total 
Over 2 Mln 56% 44% 100% 
Under 2 Mln or n.a. 61% 39% 100% 
Total 59% 41% 100% 
 
Table 13 – Tax havens involved in the chain of control of present Acquisitions and Greenfield 
investments. Sources: CI FDI Profile Dataset 
Tax havens jurisdictions No. of companies 
 HK  69 
 LU CH CY KY VG*  38 
 CH  22 
 LU  18 
 HK LU  15 
 NL SG  14 
 NL  9 
 KY  7 
 HK VG  7 
 BM  5 
 VG  4 
 HK SG  4 
 HK NL  4 
 KY VG  3 
 SG  3 
 HK KY  3 
 HK KY VG  2 
 NL CH  2 
 LU CH  2 
 LU SG  2 
 NL MT  1 
 LU KY  1 
 NL KY  1 
 BE  1 
 LU SG CY  1 
 Total  238 
* All the 38 companies in this group belong to Suntech Power Holdings, a producer of solar 
panels which defaulted in 2013. Probably protected by the very long chain of off-shore 





The analysis shows a relatively high interest of Chinese companies in tax havens. Even 
excluding Hong Kong (which is quite a natural basis for overseas Chinese investments) and the 
peculiar case of the 38 companies controlled by Suntech Power Holding, 131 companies out of 
575 (23%) has one or more controlling shareholder based in a tax haven. To make a comparison, 
a similar analysis made on Italian companies controlled by US shareholders showed that 38% 
of the companies had one or more shareholders based in tax havens (in this case mainly 
Netherlands and Luxemburg).  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the results of the tax havens analysis by showing all the tax havens 
considered and the tax havens used by Chinese-controlled acquisitions and greenfield 
investments. The tax havens involved are in red and we report in brackets the number of 
companies with at least one company in the chain of control based in the jurisdiction. 
Figure 3 Tax havens considered in our analysis and tax havens used  
by Chinese Acquisitions and Greenfield companies 
 (present investments only, shares sold/dissolved companies have been excluded)  
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Tax Haven Score 
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7. The results of Chinese acquisitions in Italy 
 
The analysis carried out on the CI FDI Profiles Dataset has enabled us to identify 198 
acquisitions with revenues of at least 2 million euros. Figure 4 shows the distribution of these 
companies by acquisition year, while Figure 5 shows total turnover and employees by year for 
the same companies: in 2019 they accounted for about 20.000 employees and they generated a 
turnover of around 12 billion euros. 
Figure 4  – Chinese Acquisitions (turnover higher than €2 mln only) by year* 
Source: CI FDI Results Dataset 
 
 
*The dataset has been built in November 2020 and 2020 data are incomplete. 
Figure 5 – Total Revenues and Employees of Chinese Acquisitions (turnover higher than €2 
mln only) by year. Companies are included starting from the year of acquisition 
























































In order to assess the impact of the Chinese acquisition on the target companies, we have 
downloaded from Aida the historical series of the following financial results: Revenues from 
Sales and Services, Employees, EBITDA, Total Assets, Total Fixed Assets, Total Shareholder’s 
Funds and we have built a series of tables showing such results after 1 year from acquisition, 2 
years from acquisition, and so on up to 10 year from acquisition. We downloaded the data on 
November 2020 and for almost all the companies the data were available up to 2019. Table 14 
shows how long the different historical series are and the number of companies we have in our 
dataset for each period. For example, we have only 10 companies with a series of 10 years of 
available data (acquired in 2008 or before), and 126 companies with at least a series of 2 years 
after acquisition. We did not analyze the results of companies with less than 2 years of available 
data. 
Table 14 – Length of data series and number of available companies 




The following Figures show the total results for each variable by length of available data series. 
Besides companies with less than 2 years of available data after the acquisition, we did not 
consider series with more than 7 years of available data, as for these series the number of 
companies was too low. 
  
Data Availability No. of 
Companies
10 years after acquisition 10               
9 years after acquisition 17               
8 years after acquisition 24               
7 years after acquisition 30               
6 years after acquisition 33               
5 years after acquisition 42               
4 years after acquisition 60               
3 years after acquisition 94               
2 years after acquisition 126             
1 year after acquisition 152             
Data available for the acquisition year 167             
Data available for the year before the acquisition 173             
Companies with incomplete historical data 25               
Total acquisitions 198             
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Figure 6 – Total Revenues of Italian companies acquired by Chinese shareholders 
Source: CI FDI Results Dataset 
 
 
Figure 7 – Total Employees of Italian companies acquired by Chinese shareholders  
Source: CI FDI Results Dataset 
 
 
Figure 8 – EBITDA of Italian companies acquired by Chinese shareholders 


































































































































































































































































































Figure 9 – Total Assets of Italian companies acquired by Chinese shareholders 
Source: CI FDI Results Dataset 
 
 
Figure 10 – Total Fixed Assets of Italian companies acquired by Chinese shareholders 
Source: CI FDI Results Dataset 
 
 
Figure 11 – Total Shareholders’ Funds of Italian companies acquired by Chinese 
shareholders 
Source: CI FDI Results Dataset 
 
 
As total results are heavily influenced by the largest companies in the dataset, in order to offer 
an analysis of the results not influenced by the size of the observed companies, in Table 12 we 
show the number of companies that experienced an increase or a decrease in the results 
considered. The change has been calculated comparing the last available year with the year of 



























































































































































































































































































Table 15 - Results from year 0 to the last available year of Italian companies  
acquired by Chinese shareholders 




Observing figures 6 to 11 and Table 15, we can comment the results as follows: 
 
• First of all, we must underline that as most of the acquisitions are quite recent, the 
number of companies with long historical series of date is small. Even if some trends 
can be identified, the analysis will be much more interesting in the coming years, when 
we will have longer time series. 
• Overall the results appear quite positive. Roughly 2/3 of the companies acquired have 
seen an increase in turnover, total assets, and shareholder’s funds and 50% has had an 
increase in Fixed Assets. A significant percentage of companies has obtained increases 
for these variable higher than 50% and the positive trend is confirmed also by total 
results (Figures 6, 9, 10, and 11). As far as revenues are concerned, the longest time 
series show a decrease in revenues soon after the acquisition followed by a steady 
growth starting from year 3. This phenomenon can be attributed to the inevitable 
problems that can arise immediately after an acquisition. In addition, in some cases, the 
acquisition took place in 2008, just before the severe crisis of year, 2009 which saw the 
sales of many durable goods collapse. 
• Employee and profitability results appear more balanced. As far as employees are 
concerned, the number of companies which has registered an increase almost equals the 
number of those which has seen a decrease. Figure 7 as well shows a very stable number 
of total employees, and this is true also when the revenues show a decrease soon after 
the acquisition year (Figure 6). It seems that Chinese shareholders prefer to avoid layoffs 
– if possible – even in front severe reductions in turnover. 
• The stable number of employees together with weak revenues soon after the acquisition 
may explain the sharp decrease in the EBITDA in the first years after the acquisition 
followed by a recovery in the following years. This trend can have several explanations: 
the target company may have inflated the EBITDA in the acquisition year with short 
term policies such as the cut of development cost; the target company has been sold 
because it was on the verge of a severe crisis; adapting to the new ownership and 
exploiting synergies requires efforts and at the beginning the cost could be higher than 
the benefits. Another hypothesis which needs further validation could be that Chinese 
shareholders prefer stability over short term profitability and do not react immediately 
to a crisis with layoffs and cost reductions. 
 
  





Decrease or no change 43             52             71             38             50             38             
Increase
- increase <=10% 11             13             5               12             5               9               
- increase between 10% and 30% 12             20             5               22             13             13             
- increase between 30% and 50% 9               9               3               15             8               14             
- increase over 50% 46             27             37             34             45             47             
Total no. of Companies 121          121          121          121          121          121          
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8. The performance of the acquired firms in the manufacturing sector 
 
The data reported and discussed so far refer to all the companies acquired by Chinese investors, 
without specific sectoral insights. Furthermore, and above all, the conclusions do not take into 
account the fact that the performance of Chinese companies is partly affected by the 
performance of the business sector to which they belong. 
 
In this section we try to fill this gap by evaluating the performance of Chinese companies in 
relation to more general industry trends. This will be done through the elaboration and use of 
some simple descriptive statistics. The focus is on the manufacturing sector, the most relevant 
from the point of view of the potential impacts of Chinese acquisitions on the Italian economy. 
 
Table 16 shows the number of Italian companies controlled by Chinese shareholders in the 
manufacturing sector, at the NACE 2-digit level, and by technology level, according to the 
EUROSTAT classification. Only companies with a total turnover of over two million euros in 
the last year (2018 or 2019) are reported.  
 
Table 16 –  Breakdown of acquired firms (turnover higher than €2 Mln only) in the 
manufacturing industry by sector 
Source: CI FDI Results Dataset 
NACE 





 High and Medium-high tech 67 66% 
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 6  
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 38  
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 6  
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 5  
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 3  
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical prep. 6  
30 (no 301) Manufacture of other transport equipment 3  
 Medium-low tech 16 16% 
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 4  
301 Ships and boats 2  
25 
Manufacture of fabricated metal prod., except machinery and 
equipment 7  
24 Manufacture of basic metals 1  
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 1  
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 1  
 Low tech 18 18% 
10 Manufacture of food products 3  
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel 3  
31 Manufacture of furniture 3  
32 (no 325) Other manufacturing 3  
13 Manufacture of textiles 3  
15 Manufacture of leather and related products 3  
  Total 101 100% 
 
 
With regard to manufacturing, Chinese investors are mainly interested in the acquisition of 
medium-high technology companies (66% of the total), most of which in the machinery and 
24 
 
equipment sector (motors, turbines, pumps, compressors, taps, ovens, burners, machines for 
industry and metalworking). This is one of the most dynamic and export-oriented sectors of the 
Italian economy (17.5% of manufacturing export). Most of these acquisitions are probably 
motivated by the need to acquire valuable know-how and technology. Notice that in Europe, 
the industrial machinery and equipment, ICT and automotive sectors have been the main targets 
of Chinese investors over the past decade (see Ktratz et al. 2020). In Italy, however, the first 
two sectors appear to be relatively less attractive to Chinese companies so far. 
 
Chinese investors are also interested in buying low-tech companies producing traditional Made 
in Italy products in the textile, clothing, leather and footwear sectors (18% of the total). In this 
case, it is likely that investors aim to achieve greater market access or take advantage of an 
established brand. 
 
In terms of size measured by average revenues in 2017-2019, the acquired firms in the 
machinery and equipment sector are relatively small. The largest companies acquired are in the 
sector of rubber and plastics, basically due to the acquisition of Pirelli, followed by other 
transport equipment and electrical equipment, although in these cases the number of 
acquisitions is lower (Table 17). 
 
Table 17 –  Breakdown of acquired firms in the manufacturing industry by sector and size 
(number of firms and average revenues 2017-2019, ‘000 euros) 



























28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 38 37,62 871.330 35,42 24.895 1,24 
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 6 5,94 413.654 5,75 68.942 3,43 
27 Electrical equipment 6 5,94 822.249 4,77 137.042 6,81 
21 Pharmaceuticals 6 5,94 146.428 6,22 29.286 1,46 
20 Chemicals and chemical products 5 4,95 347.136 6,29 86.784 4,31 
22 Rubber and plastics 4 3,96 3.928.069 8,91 982.017 48,81 
25 Metal products 7 6,93 207.777 5,89 51.944 2,58 
10 Food products 3 2,97 274.341 1,95 91.447 4,55 
14 Wearing apparel 3 2,97 131.566 3,29 43.855 2,18 
15 Leather products and footwear 3 2,97 19.673 0,42 6.558 0,33 
29 Motor vehicles 3 2,97 201.975 2,30 67.325 3,35 
31 Furniture 3 2,97 49.841 4,16 16.614 0,83 
13 Textiles 3 2,97 26.467 2,38 13.234 0,66 
30 Other transport equipment 5 4,95 581.591 5,25 290.795 14,45 
32 Other manufacturing 3 2,97 40.871 2,69 20.435 1,02 
33 Repair and installation of machinery 1 0,99 90.170 1,16 45.085 2,24 
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 1 0,99 3.991 0,88 3.991 0,20 
24 Basic metals 1 0,99 31.537 2,27 31.537 1,57 
 TOTAL 101 100,00 8.188.667 100,00 2.011.786 100,00 
 
In the service sector, the largest number of target companies are by far in the wholesale and 
retail sector. This is clearly a low knowledge-intensive sector, but ownership of an existing 
distribution network can be crucial for the sale of a large variety of Chinese products in the 
Italian market. Note that wholesale and retail trade accounted for the vast majority of the 






We now turn to the analysis of the performance of the target companies after the takeover by 
Chinese shareholders. To measure the performance, we have selected three main variables.  
 
The first two are employment and revenues, the third, and probably most important variable is 
the value added per employee, a standard indicator of productivity. For all these variables, we 
take the value of the year before the acquisition and compare it with the value reported in the 
last available year (2019 for most companies). We restrict our analysis to the manufacturing 
sector. We exclude from the sample both the companies acquired in 2019 and 2020, as the 
period is too short for an assessment, and those with a limited set of data. For this reason, the 
number of companies in our sample is reduced from 101 to 83.  
 
We must bear in mind that the observed performance is the result of the specific history of each 
company, which should be analyzed on a case by case basis. However, outside the domain of 
the company, four major general factors can play a role: the number of years since the 
acquisition, the size of the company, the technological level and, most importantly, the general 
trend of the specific industry to which these companies belong. 
 
In order to evaluate the performance of the acquired companies, we identify a control group, 
for each 3-digit manufacturing industry, consisting of all the Italian companies reported in the 
AIDA database with turnover exceeding two million euros. Table 18 shows the number of firms 
in each control group. For each variable, we measure and compare the average performance of 
the control group over the same period of time considered for the acquired company. 
 
Table 18 – Number of firms by 3-digit manufacturing sector. Sample and control group 




























1041 Manufacture of oils and fats 1 120 2620 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 1 140 
1061 Manufacture of grain mill products 1 216 2660 Manufacture electromedical equipment 2 172 
1071 Manufacture of bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes 1 237 2751 Manufacture of electric domestic appliances 2 100 
1310 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 1 236 2752 Manufacture of non-electric domestic appliances 2 33 
1330 Finishing of textiles 1 232 2790 Manufacture of other electrical equipment 2 502 
1396 Manufacture of other technical and industrial textiles 1 186 2822 Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment 3 366 
1410 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel 2 853 2825 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equip. 1 372 
1413 Manufacture of other outerwear 1 380 2829 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery nec 7 945 
1511 Tanning and dressing of leather and fur 1 442 2840 Manufacture of metal forming machinery and machine tools 3 571 
1520 Manufacture of footwear 1 717 2849 Manufacture of other machine tools 1 210 
2010 Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers 1 437 2892 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarr. and 
construction 
1 143 
2016 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 1 169 2894 Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather 
prod. 
3 209 
2059 Manufacture of other chemical products nec 1 340 2895 Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard prod. 3 96 
2100 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 1 310 2896 Manufacture of plastic and rubber machinery 1 181 
2110 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products 1 68 2899 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery nec 7 333 
2120 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 3 208 2931 Manufacture of electric. and electronic equip.for motor 
vehicles 
1 41 
2211 Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes 3 29 2932 Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor 
vehicles 
2 368 
2219 Manufacture of other rubber products 1 316 3011 Building of ships and floating structures 1 84 
2370 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 1 303 3012 Building of pleasure and sporting boats 1 92 
2410 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 1 92 3030 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery 1 49 
2511 Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures 2 865 3091 Manufacture of motorcycles 2 53 
2562 Machining 1 923 3101 Manufacture of office and shop furniture 2 287 
2573 Manufacture of tools 1 639 3109 Manufacture of other furniture 1 535 
2611 Manufacture of electronic components 1 151 3212 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 1 277 
2612 Manufacture of loaded electronic boards 1 98 3220 Manufacture of musical instruments 1 10 
 3299 TOTAL 83 14736 
 
On the basis of this approach, we try to answer the following  question: compared to the average 
performance of the control group, is the acquired company improving or worsening its 
performance? We construct a simple index given by the ratio between the value of the 
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performance variable of the acquired firm over the corresponding value of the control group. If 
the index is greater than 1, the acquired firm performs better than the industry average, while if 
it less than 1, the firm loses ground to its peers. We compute this index for the year before 
acquisition -the starting point- and for the last reported year (2019 for most firms). 
 
Figure 12 reports the results of the analysis in terms of added value per employee. The figure 
compares the performance of the acquired company in the year preceding the acquisition (on 
the X axis) with the last reported year (on the Y axis), again in relation to the performance of 
the control group (see the index described above). Looking more closely at the figure, six 
different groups of firms can be identified.  
 
In general, more than half (46 firms, 55.4%) of the acquired companies did better than the 
control group in the years following the acquisition. These firms are indicated by the points 
above the 45° degree line in the graph. On the top right triangle of the figure we find the Best 
Performers (BP), the firms that already performed better than the control group in the year 
before the acquisition and that improved their relative position after the acquisition (10 firms, 
12%). Best improvers (BI) include the firms that were performing below average before the 
acquisition but that improved the productivity compared to the control group in the years 
following the acquisition (13 firms, 15.7%). These firms are indicated in the upper left square 
of  Figure 12. The Improvers (IMP), on the left of the lower square of the graph, is the largest 
group in the sample. These firms improved their performance under Chinese control but 
performed worse than the industry average both before and after the acquisition (23 firms, 
27.7%).  
 
Figure 12 – Value Added per Employee (VAE) Last reported year and Year before acquisition 
 (Ratio Acquired firm / Control group)  





















































Figure 13 – Gross growth rate of Employment (EMP) since acquisition. 
Acquired firms and control group (EMP last reported year / EMP year before acquisition) 




The firms in the last three groups worsened the productivity during the period following the 
acquisition. In the lower triangle at the top right square of the graph, we find the firms with a 
productivity level above the industry average in both periods but which have worsened their 
relative position after the acquisition.  These companies can be called Efficiency Losers after 
the acquisition (EL) (10 firms, 12%). Another group includes the Worst Efficiency Losers 
(WEL), which started with a productivity above the average before acquisition and ended up 
underperforming the control group in the last year (8 firms, 9,6%). The last group includes the 
Worst Performers (WP) (19 firms, 22.9%). These firms showed below-average productivity 
levels before the acquisition and further worsened efficiency in the post-acquisition period. 
 
More generally, looking more closely at the data shown in the figure, it is interesting to note 
that the majority of the firms acquired by Chinese shareholders showed, at the time of the 
takeover, a lower performance in terms of productivity compared to the industry average. This 
is the case of 55 companies, the sum of the three groups BI, IMP and WP. However, in the 
years after the acquisition, a good 65.4% of these firms improved their performance. On the 
other side, only 28 companies were performing better compared to the control group before the 
acquisition (groups BP, EL and WEL). Under Chinese control, only 10 of them improved the 
performance in the following years (35.7%). 
 
Figures 13 and 14 report a similar analysis for the other two variables under consideration, 
employment and revenues. Notice that in this case we can only compare the growth rates of the 
Chinese firms, from the last year before acquisition to the last reported year after the acquisition, 
with the growth rates of the control group during the same period. Growth rates of the control 
group are reported on the X-axis, while growth rates of the Chinese firms are on the Y-axis. For 
both variables, the majority of firms acquired by Chinese companies and shareholders 
performed better than the control group after the acquisition: 54.2% for employment and 51.8% 
for revenues.  


































As in the former analysis of the value added per employee, it is possible to identify six different 
groups of companies, with the same labels as before, according to the value and the sign of the 
growth rates of the acquired firms and those of the control group. It suffices to note that in both 
figures the group of Best Performers (both acquired firms and control group firms grow, but 
acquired firms at a faster rate) is the largest group. Furthermore, from the linear estimates of 
the relationship between the two variables reported in the top right of the graph, we can infer 
that the growth rates of the acquired firms and the control group are positively correlated. This 
result suggests that the post-acquisition performance of the acquired firms is to some extent 
affected by the general performance of the corresponding manufacturing sector.  
 
The impact of the new corporate management on the company performance needs time to 
unfold. It takes time to adapt, restructure and reorganize the plants and the company, possibly 
investing in new machinery and equipment. This explains why, for the acquired companies, the 
gross growth rates of all the three variables (employment, value added per employee, revenues) 
is positively related to the number of years since acquisition. Figure 15 shows the three 
boxplots, one for each variable, which reports the statistical distributions (mean, median, first 
and third quartile) of the gross growth rates according to the years passed since the acquisition: 
1-2 years (Group 1), 3-5 years (Group 2), more than 5 years (Group 3). For all the variables, 
the mean and, above all, the median values are greater for the last two groups and firms show 
a greater variability after more than five years since acquisition (see the detailed descriptive 
statistics in Appendix 3). In particular, this is the case of employment, where the distribution in 
the third group is clearly more right skewed compared to the other two groups.  
 
Figure 14 – Gross growth rate of Revenues (REV) since acquisition. 
Acquired firms and control group (REV last reported year / REV year before acquisition) 


































Applying the same type of analysis with regards to the size class (Figure 16), the evidence is 
more varied and the differences between groups less pronounced. In the cases of employment 
and revenues growth (Figure 16-A), it seems that the smallest firms and those with a size 
between 50 and 99 employees, are the more dynamic, while for value added growth the two 
central groups show a better performance (see Appendix 3). 
 
The level of technological intensity might have an impact on the economic performance of the 
acquired companies. There is some evidence of this by looking at Figure 17, which reports the 
boxplots for the three variables under consideration and four classes of technological level. For 
employment and revenue growth, firms in medium-high technology sectors look more dynamic. 
Notice that this class includes the machinery and equipment industry, one of the top target of 
acquisitions of Chinese companies in Europe in the last decade. 
 
Summarizing the evidence discussed so far, the acquisitions of Italian companies by Chinese 
investors seem to show an overall positive impact on the acquired companies. Compared to 
control groups, most Chinese companies perform better in all three selected indicators: value 
added per employee, employment and revenue growth.  
 
The simple descriptive statistical analysis presented in this paper is the first step in trying to 
uncover the main drivers of good and successful performance. The three factors highlighted - 
time since acquisition, size and technological intensity –certainly played an important role. 
However, the explanation for all these findings is still unclear. More in-depth analysis with the 
use of an econometric model and multiple control factors is probably needed, as will be done 
in a related paper, to shed more light on this issue. 
 
 
Figure 15 – Boxplots of performance of acquired firms by years since acquisition 
 (Gross growth rate: ratio Last reported year / Year before acquisition) 
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Figure 16 – Boxplots of performance of acquired firms by size group 
 (Gross growth rate: ratio Last reported year / Year before acquisition) 




Figure 17 – Boxplots of performance of acquired firms by technological level 
 (Gross growth rate: ratio Last reported year / Year before acquisition) 
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9. Qualitative analysis 
 
The third phase of our research consists in a qualitative analysis of acquired companies, 
primarily aimed at understanding the reasons behind the acquisition from the point of view of 
both the target and the acquirer, the results after the acquisition, the management style and 
development strategies of acquirers, and post-acquisition processes and cross-cultural issues. 
The following table summarizes the first results of this type of analysis. 






















2010 State owned Same Market 
Expansion 








2011 State owned Same Know-how 
access 









Same Failure risk Hand off Disappointing 
until 2016, very 








2016 State owned Similar Market 
Expansion 





























Similar Failure risk Hand off Positive Positive 
Candy Hoover 
Group 
Haier Group 2018 Private 
Company 
Same Failure risk Hand off Not yet evaluable Positive (3) 
CIFA Group Changsha Zoomlion 2008 Private 
Company 
Same High offer Hand off Neutral Positive 
Clivet Group Midea Group 2016 Private 
Company 








Hands off Positive Positive 






Hands off Positive Positive 
Conceria del 
Chienti 
Jihua Group 2014 Private 
Company 





Bluestar (Group)  
2007 State owned Same Market 
Expansion 
Hands off Positive Positive 






Similar High offer Hand off Positive Neutral 
Evolut S.p.a. Efort Intelligent 2016 Private 
company 
Same Failure risk Hands off Positive Positive 
Ferretti Group Shig Weichai Group 2012 State owned Similar Failure risk Hand off Positive Positive 









Corporation of China  
2017 State owned Same Market 
Expansion 
Hands off Positive Positive 
Kollant S.r.l. China National 
Chemical 
Corporation 
2011 State owned Similar Market 
Expansion 

















Hands on Negative Positive 
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Hands off Positive Positive 














Hands off Positive Positive 
NT Majocchi 
S.r.l 
Jihua Group Co., 
Ltd. 




Efort Intelligent 2017 Private 
company 
Similar Failure risk Hands off Negative Neutral 
Pamec S.r.l. Zoomlion  2019 Private 
company 
Similar Failure risk Not yet 
evaluable 
Not yet evaluable Not yet 
evaluable 
Pirelli Group ChemChina 2015 State owned Similar High offer Hand off Neutral Neutral 




Hands off Positive Neutral 




Hand off Positive Neutral 
SIR S.p.a. Wolong Electric 














Hands off Neutral Positive 
Webb 
Robotica S.r.l. 




Hands off Positive Neutral 
(1) The ambitious investment plan by Gansu Gantai has been curbed by the restrictions issued by the Chinese Government on 
investments in the luxury and entertainment industries. Buccellati has been sold to the Richmond Group on Sept 2019 
(2) In 2018 the Geely Group has acquired a major stake in Qianjiang Group. 
(3) Even if it’s too early to evaluate the employment results of this acquisition, in 2019 Haier has unexpectedly brought back 
to Italy the production of washing machines that previous owners had offshored to China, averting the layoff of 135 
employees on redundancy pay. 
 
 
Although we are at the very beginning of this phase, some trends such as the preference a hand-
off style of management and the interests in companies competing in the same or strongly 
related industries clearly emerge. 
10. Conclusions and some ideas for future work 
 
Should we fear or hope for Chinese acquisitions? After carrying out an initial evaluation of the 
data and information contained in our database on the companies owned by Chinese investors 
in Italy, we can give a positive answer to the question posed in the title of our work. Although 
the presence of Chinese investors in Italy is a relatively recent phenomenon, compared with 
other foreign investors, the good performance of most Chinese companies in terms of turnover, 
employment and productivity is certainly an encouraging sign. What seems more important, is 
that in many cases the results of the Chinese companies are above those of the other Italian 
firms in the same industry. However, our analysis is only exploratory and preliminary, and it 
will be necessary in the future to use more robust and sound empirical investigation tools to 
reach more reliable conclusions.  
 
Our research is still ongoing and we have some ideas on what remains to be done. In order to 
get more reliable data, the database should be updated for the next 3 years. In the meantime, it 
is possible to develop a qualitative analysis for all the acquisitions using secondary data and, 
for some relevant cases, with structured interviews. The qualitative analysis, among other 
things, could allow us to understand if there is a significant difference in behaviour between 
private and state owned acquirers. 
 
It would be also interesting to compare the results and management style of the Chinese 





Despite the limits of our work, our research already provides some interesting hints on the 
relevance, management style, results, and desirability of Chinese investments in general, and 
of Chinese acquisitions in particular. For example, some results seem to indicate that Chinese 
investors may be particularly long term oriented compared to their Western counterparts, and 
less obsessed with short-term earnings results. This behaviour is consistent with the long term 
orientation of the Chinese Culture. According to the well known Hofstede’s Culture Compass, 
China scores very high in the dimension “Long Term Orientation”, with a score of 87, against 
a score of 61 for Italy and of 26 for the United States. Using Hofstede’s words, countries with 
high long term orientation “show an ability to adapt traditions easily to changed conditions, a 
strong propensity to save and invest, thriftiness, and perseverance in achieving results”.  This 
supposed greater long-term orientation of Chinese companies deserves further study and it 




Bickenbach F., Liu W. (2018), “Chinese Direct Investment in Europe – Challenges for EU FDI Policy”, 
CESifo Forum, 19(4), 15-22. 
 
Boateng A., Qian W., Tianle Y. (2008), “Cross-Border M&As by Chinese Firms: An Analysis 
of Strategic Motives and Performance”, Thunderbird International Business Review, 50(4), 259- 
270. 
 
Brod M., Schüler-Zhou Y., Schüller M. (2012), “Push and Pull Factors for Chinese OFDI in 
Europe”, in I. Alon, M. Fetscherin, & P. Gugler (eds.), Chinese International Investments (pp. 
157-174), New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Buckley P.J., Elia S., Kafouros M. (2011), “FDI from Emerging to Advanced Countries: Some Insights 
on the Acquisition Strategies and on the Performance of Target Firms”, Economia e Politica Industriale, 
March 2011, 38-1, pp. 181-97. 
 
Chang S.J., Chung J., Moon J.J. (2013), “When Do Foreign Subsidiaries Outperform Local Firms?”, 
Journal of International Business Studies, 44-8, pp. 853-60. 
 
Edamura K., Haneda S. Inui T. Tan X. Todo Y. (2014),  “Impact of Chinese Cross-Border Outbound 
M&As on Firm Performance: Econometric Analysis Using Firm-Level Data”, China Economic Review, 
30, pp. 169-79 
 
Hanemann T. (2014), “Chinese direct investment in the EU and the US: a comparative view”, Asia 
Europe Journal (2014) 12:127–142. 
Hanemann T., Huotari M. (2018), “EU-China FDI: Working Towards Reciprocity In Investment 
Relations”, Report, MERICS Papers on China, No 3, Update, May,  Rhodium Group and Mercator. 
Hay, F. (2016), “Chinese investors in Europe: some idiosyncrasies”, in Bakir C. and Brennan L. 
(eds.), Emerging Market Multinationals in Europe (pp. 115-128). Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Knoerich J., Miedtank T. (2018), “Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the EU”, CESifo Forum, 19(4), 
3-8. 
 
Kratz A., Huotari M., Hanemann T., Arcesati R. (2020), “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update”, 
MERICS Papers on China, April. 
 
Liu Q. Lu R., Qiu L.D. (2017), “Foreign Acquisitions and Target Firms' Performance in China”, World 




Ma, Y., Overbeek H. (2015), “Chinese foreign direct investment in the European Union: explaining 
changing patterns”, Global Affairs, 1(4/5), 441-454. 
 
Mathews, J. A. (2006), “Dragon Multinationals: New Players in 21st Century Globalization”, Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 23, 5-27. 
 
Meunier S. (2014), “’Beggars Can’t Be Choosers’: The European Crisis and Chinese Direct Investment 
in the European Union”, Journal of European Integration, 36:283–302. 
 
Meunier S., Burgoon B., Jacoby W. (2014), ”The politics of hosting Chinese investment in Europe—an 
introduction”, Asia Europe Journal, 12:109–126. 
 
Meunier S. (2018), “Beware of Chinese bearing gifts: Why China’s Direct Investment Poses Political 
Challenges in Europe and the United States”,  in Chaisse J. ed., China’s three-prong investment strategy: 
bilateral, regional, and global tracks, London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wang, J. ,Wang X. (2015), “Benefits of Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Foreign Direct Investment 
in China”, Journal of International Economics, November 2015, v. 97-2, pp. 325-38. 
 
Zhang H. A. (2014), “Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility”, Northwestern 
Journal of International Law & Business, 34:395.  
 
Zhang H. (2014), “Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment in the EU − Opportunities and 
Challenges for European SMEs to Link into the Global Value Chain of Chinese Multinational 





Appendix 1 – Content of the fields in the CI FDI Profile Database downloaded from AIDA 
 
Fields Comments 
Company name   
BvD ID number It's the number given by Bureau van Dijk (BvD), and it's the same 
used for a given company in all the BvD databases. 
Province   
Legal status Active; Bankruptcy; In liquidation 
Legal form Consortium; General partnership - SNC; Joint stock company - SPA; 
Limited liability company - SRL; Limited liability company, simplified; 
Limited liability consortium; Limited partnership - SAS; One-person 
company with limited liability - SRL; One-person joint stock company 
- SPA 
Incorporation year   
Last accounting closing date   
No of available years   
Turnover (last year) m EUR Last avail. yr   
Total assets (last year) m EUR Last avail. yr   
Employees (last year) Last avail. yr   
BvD independence indicator   
No of companies in corporate group   
No of recorded shareholders   
No of recorded subsidiaries   
NACE Rev. 2 Industry Classification - Level 4 (Codes) 
NACE Rev. 2 description Industry Classification - Level 4 (Description) 
GUO - Name GUO stands for Global Ultimate Owner. It's this field that has enables 
us to identify che Italian companies partecipated or controlled by 
Chinese individuals or companies 
GUO - Country ISO code   
GUO - City   
GUO - Type Bank; Corporate; Employees, managers, directors; Financial 
company; Foundation, research Institute; Insurance company; 
Mutual and pension fund, nominee, trust, trustee; One or more 
named individuals or families; Public authority, state, government 
GUO - Direct %   
GUO - Total %   
GUO - Also a manager Current manager; Not a manager; Previous manager 
CSH - Name CSH stands for Company Share Holders 
CSH - BvD ID number   
CSH - Ticker symbol   
CSH - Country ISO code   
CSH - City   
CSH - Type Bank; Corporate; Employees, managers, directors; Financial 
company; Foundation, research Institute; Insurance company; 
Mutual and pension fund, nominee, trust, trustee; One or more 
named individuals or families; Public authority, state, government 
CSH - Direct %   
CSH - Total %   
CSH - Operating revenue (Turnover) m EUR   
CSH - Total assets m EUR   
CSH - Number of employees   
CSH - Also a manager Current manager; Not a manager; Previous manager 




Appendix 2 – Content of the fields manually added to the CI FDI Profile Database 
 
Field Content 





Identifies the companies manually added to or cancelled from the set 
generated by AIDA. We have added few companies when sure of the 
Chinese stake, even if not registered in AIDA and companies previously 
controlled by Chinese investors even if now they have sold their shares or 
the company has been dissolved/merged, while we have cancelled a few 
companies controlled by Chinese companies which were controlled by non 
Chinese shareholder. The total of 7.382 companies includes 233 added 
companies and excludes 6 cancelled companies. 
Size (categories - Mln Euros) 
  
A ->100; B - 30-99; C - 10-29; D - 4-9; E - 3-3.999; F - 2-2.999; G - 1-
1.999; H - 0.001-0.999; I – 0; Z - n.a. 
Size 2 (categories - Mln Euros) 
  
A ->1000; B - 500-999; C - 100-499; D - 90-99; E - 80-89; F - 70-79; G - 
60-69; H - 50-59; I - 40-49; L - 30-39; M - 20-29; N - 10-19; O - 4-9; P - 3-
3.999; Q - 2-2.999; R - 1-1.999; S - 0.001-0.999; T - 0; Z - n.a. 
Size 3 (categories - Mln Euros) Over 2 Mln; Under 2 Mln or n.a. 
Majority/ Minority Majority; Minority; Minority <10%; Shares sold/Dissolved 
Chinese investment year 
  
Year of the first investment by the Chinese shareholder. The results of the 
acquired company in the CI FDI Results Dataset are monitored starting 
from the year before the first investment by the Chinese shareholder. 
Chinese share Total share owned by Chinese shareholders 
Chinese Shareholder name 
  
Name of the most relevant company or individual in the shareholders chain 
of control. For example, for Pirelli it's CHINA NATIONAL CHEMICAL 
CORPORATION. 
Chinese Shareholder Type 
  
Bank; Corporate; Dissolved; Financial company; Foundation/Research 
institute; Insurance company; Mutual and pension fund, nominee, trust, 
trustee; One or more named individuals or families; Private equity firm 
GUO Chinese Shareholder – Name 
Name of the Global Ultimate Owner. For example, for Pirelli it's CHINA-
PEOPLE'S REP. 
GUO Chinese Shareholder Type 
  
Bank; Corporate; Financial company; Foundation, research Institute; 
Insurance company; Mutual and pension fund, nominee, trust, trustee; One 
or more named individuals or families; Public authority, state, government 
GUO Chinese Shareholder –  
Type Synthesis 
Individuals; Private company; State Owned, Undetected. 
  
Investment Type  Acquisition; Entrepreneurial Activities; Greenfield; Minority; Undetected. 




Industry Classification - Level 2 (Description). AIDA specifies for each 
company the NACE Level 4 industry classification, but in most cases this 
classification is too detailed. For this reason, on the basis of the level 4 
classification we identified and added to the dataset the Level 2 
classification as well. 
Technology intensity  




Country ISO Codes of tax havens involved 
  
Tax havens Yes/No 
  












Appendix 3 – Boxplots, descriptive statistics 
Boxplot Growth of VALUE ADDED PER EMPLOYEE by YEARS SINCE ACQUISITION 
YEARS Mean min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 1,0528 0,28160 0,77955 0,97017 1,2137 3,1071 (n=28) 
2 1,2927 0,22321 0,90924 1,1169 1,3216 4,4267 (n=30) 
3 1,6984 -0,24114 1,1449 1,4948 1,9293 4,4444 (n=25) 
Boxplot Growth of EMPLOYMENT by YEARS SINCE ACQUISITION  
 
YEARS Mean min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 1,1123 0,71429 0,93028 1,05460 1,3233 1,6250 (n=28) 
2 1,3296 0,73000 1,01530 1,2234 1,5376 3,1905 (n=30) 
3 1,5684 0,73684 0,8387 1,1333 2,3603 3,5000 (n=25) 
Boxplot Growth of REVENUES by YEARS SINCE ACQUISITION  
 
YEARS Mean min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 1,0627 0,15406 0,85237 1,00110 1,2729 1,9374 (n=28) 
2 2,1136 0,49028 1,07410 1,4534 1,7207 11,0490 (n=30) 
3 1,9347 0,75401 0,9969 1,3518 2,5661 6,7248 (n=25) 
Boxplot Growth of VALUE ADDED PER EMPLOYEE by SIZE  
 
SIZE Mean min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 1,1229 -0,24114 0,87250 1,13720 1,4948 2,0453 (n=19) 
2 1,3047 0,22321 0,80900 1,0933 1,5005 4,4267 (n=20) 
3 1,5748 0,23339 0,9118 1,2912 2,4188 3,6718 (n=16) 
4 1,2845 0,2816 0,78339 1,2762 1,6911 3,1071 (n=13) 
5 1,8081 0,85206 0,99931 1,17520 2,8300 4,4444 (n=8) 
6 0,9899 0,47017 0,80920 0,9448 1,2433 1,3313 (n=7) 
Boxplot Growth of EMPLOYMENT by SIZE  
 
SIZE Mean min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 1,4920 0,73684 0,92857 1,38890 1,7143 3,5000 (n=19) 
2 1,2631 0,71429 0,90174 1,0567 1,4630 2,4900 (n=20) 
3 1,4689 0,88421 1,1031 1,3090 1,5362 3,1905 (n=16) 
4 1,2196 0,76316 0,92058 1,2095 1,3993 2,2564 (n=13) 
5 1,2617 0,79810 0,83064 0,95621 1,2284 3,3553 (n=8) 
6 1,0261 0,92092 0,95410 1,0035 1,0972 1,2124 (n=7) 
Boxplot REVENUES by SIZE  
 
SIZE Mean min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 2,2054 0,75401 1,04270 1,43010 1,7464 11,0490 (n=19) 
2 1,2475 0,15406 0,92486 1,0608 1,5276 2,9560 (n=20) 
3 1,9523 0,49028 0,9714 1,6242 2,2199 8,0751 (n=16) 
4 1,7351 0,28746 0,90911 1,153 1,9658 7,5182 (n=13) 
5 1,6675 0,86336 0,89381 1,17520 1,5561 5,3346 (n=8) 
6 1,0786 0,80996 0,81128 1,0806 1,2069 1,6423 (n=7) 
Boxplot VALUE ADDED PER EMPLOYEE by technological level group  
 
TECH Mean min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 1,1983 0,22321 0,69330 1,09210 1,3903 3,6718 (n=17) 
2 1,6063 -0,24114 0,82670 1,2426 2,6631 4,4444 (n=12) 
3 1,3131 0,23339 0,9025 1,1146 1,5250 4,4267 (n=42) 
4 1,3269 0,737 0,86605 1,2094 1,5513 2,8899 (n=12) 
Boxplot EMPLOYMENT by technological level group  
 
TECH Mean min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 1,4051 0,73000 0,81509 1,02660 1,5278 3,5000 (n=17) 
2 1,3174 0,71429 0,81703 1,0322 1,4222 3,3553 (n=12) 
3 1,3618 0,76316 1,0007 1,2849 1,5601 3,1905 (n=42) 
4 1,1129 0,81132 0,98124 1,0433 1,2378 1,5294 (n=12) 
Boxplot REVENUES by technological level group  
 
TECH Medan min Q1 Median Q3 max N 
1 1,4918 0,28746 0,81614 1,0996 1,6162 6,7248 (n=17) 
2 1,6298 0,15406 0,9663 1,1705 1,8636 5,3346 (n=12) 
3 1,939 0,49028 0,9676 1,3329 1,7403 11,049 (n=42) 
4 1,2648 0,81128 0,91697 1,0713 1,724 2,133 (n=12) 
